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Abstract. Most of the theories on formalising intention interpret it as a unary
modal operator in Kripkean semantics, which gives it a monotonic look. We argue
that policy-based intentions [8] exhibit non-monotonic behaviour which could be
captured through a non-monotonic system like defeasible logic. To this end we
outline a defeasible logic of intention. The proposed technique alleviates most of
the problems related to logical omniscience. The proof theory given shows how
our approach helps in the maintenance of intention-consistency in agent systems
like BDI.
1 Introduction
Formalising cognitive states like intention has received much attention in the AI com-
munity [7,17,18,23]. All these theories are based on Normal Modal Logics (NMLs),
where intention is formalised into a modal operator on the framework of kripkean pos-
sible world semantics. Due to this restriction, these theories suffer from the logical-
omniscience problem [10,22]. One of the solutions suggested to overcome this prob-
lem is to adopt a non-kripkean semantics as shown in [5]. In that work intention is
interpreted in terms of its content and the intention consequence relation is explained
based on the content of two intentions. There is also a representationalist theory of
intention [11] that employs the minimal model semantics [4] to interpret the intention
operator. Work has also been done relating intention to preferences [20] as well as com-
mitments [6]. However none of these theories have explicitly addressed the need for a
non-monotonic theory of intention and we argue that to capture the properties involved
in policy-based intention we need such a non-monotonic setup.
Our claim is based on Bratman’s [8] classification of intention as deliberative, non-
deliberative, policy-based and we show that policy-based intention is non-monotonic
(i.e. has a defeasible nature). Though, many of the theories mentioned above is based
on Bratman’s work, they fail to recognize the non-monotonic component involved in
intention. In this paper we adopt a particular non-monotonic system, (defeasible logic),
to study the properties involved in policy-based intention and show how one can relate
it with an intentional system like BDI [17]. The reason for defeasible logic is due to
its computational efficiency [13] and easy implementation [15]. We are unaware of any
existing work relating reasoning about intention with non-monotonic reasoning to the
best of our knowledge. We believe that our approach helps in bridging the gap between
non-monotonic reasoning and reasoning about intention.
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The proposed method provides solutions to the problem of logical-omniscience
which usually accompanies intention-formalisms based on normal modal logics. The
use of non-monotonic logics in intention reasoning allows the agent to reason with par-
tial knowledge without having a complete knowledge of the environment. This also
helps the agent in avoiding a complete knowledge of the consequences. Moreover, we
outline a proof-theory whereby one can reason about ways of maintaining intention
consistency in agent systems like BDI. The new approach facilitates the designer of an
agent system like BDI in describing rules for constructing intentions from goals and
goals from knowledge. This is important as it is in alliance with the commitment ax-
ioms of Rao and Georgeff [17] and also provides an explanation on the practical nature
of intentional systems like BDI. In this paper we don’t want to recast the whole BDI
theory but focus on the intention part supplemented by the factual knowledge and its
underlying theory. Moreover similar considerations can be applied to the GOAL com-
ponent.
In the next section we make the case for a non-monotonic theory of intention based
on Bratman’s classification of intention. In the third section we outline the problem
of logical omniscience and in the fourth we give an overview of defeasible logic. The
fifth section argues for a defeasible logic of intention. In the final section we make a
comparison between our work and the work in policy-based reasoning
2 The Case for Non-Monotonic Reasoning
An important classification of intention that is useful in computer science is that of
intending versus doing intentionally, where the former involves the true intentions or
preferences of the agent whereas the latter applies to the actions or states that the agent
performs or brings about but not with any prior intention to do so. Based on this division
Bratman classifies intentions as deliberative, non-deliberative and policy-based. When
an agent i has an intention of the form INTt1i ϕ, t2 (read as agent i intends at t1 to ϕ at t2)
as a process of present deliberation, then it is called deliberative intention. On the other
hand if the agent comes to have such an intention not on the basis of present delibera-
tion, but at some earlier time t0 and have retained it from t0 to t1 without reconsidering
it then it is called non-deliberative. There can be a third case when intentions can be
general and concern potentially recurring circumstances in an agent’s life. Such general
intentions constitute policy-based intentions, and is defined as follows: when the agent
i has a general-(policy/intention) to ϕ in circumstances of type ψ and i notes at t1 that i
am (will be) in a ψ-type circumstance at t2, and thereby arrive at an intention to ϕ at t2.
The difference here is that there is no present deliberation concerning the action to be
performed as the agent already has a general intention to do a particular action (doing
intentionally). Whether the agent is able to perform that action or not depends on the
circumstances.
When dealing with such general policies/intentions (hereafter intention), we have
to take into account two cases. General intentions could be either (1) periodic or (2)
circumstance-triggered. They are periodic in the sense that their occasion for execution
is guaranteed by the mere passage of a specific interval of time. For instance, the gen-
eral intention of patching up and rebooting the Unix server, hobbit in our department
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on every friday at 7pm. In contrast to this, general intention could be circumstance trig-
gered as in the case of being Root if one is Super-user. Its occasion is not guaranteed by
the mere passage of time but require that certain specific circumstances obtain. In both
cases one can find that the general intention has an underlying defeasible nature. The
defeasible nature is explained as follows. Consider the above example for circumstance-
triggered general intention:
SU(X)⇒ Root(X) (1)
which means, (super-users are typically root). Suppose, there exists an agent i (a soft-
ware program) that monitors tasks related to giving root permissions as and according
to whether a user is a normal-user (NU) or Super-User (SU) and i has a general intention
like (1). This general intention has a defeasible nature in the sense that, if i knows that
X is a SU then i may conclude that X is Root, unless there is other evidence suggest-
ing that X may not be root (for instance, when X has only read and write permissions
but not execute permission). But this does not mean that the agent i should know all
such conditions but, only those he considers necessary to the intended outcome and that
he/she isn’t confident of their being satisfied. Hence our definition of general intention
boils down to:
An agent intends all the necessary consequences of his performing his general
intention and he isn’t confident of their being satisfied.
In order to intend the necessary consequence the agent has to make sure that all the
evidence to the contrary has been defeated which basically is a defeasible logic conclu-
sion. This is different from the usual NML interpretation where the agent intends all the
consequences.
The formation of such general policies helps in extending the influence of delib-
eration as it is a partial solution to the problems posed by our limited resources for
calculation and deliberation at the time of action. General policies also facilitate co-
ordination. It may sometimes be easier to appreciate expectable consequences (both
good and bad) of general ways of acting in recurrent circumstances than to appreciate
the expectable consequences of a single case.
3 Logical Omniscience and Non-Monotonicity
As we mentioned before, most of the theories based on NML’s interpret intention as a
unary modal operator in Kripkean semantics which makes it vulnerable to the problem
of logical-omniscience. The problem in its general form as stated in [22] is as follows:
(where X could represent a mental state like intention (INT)
1. |= Xϕ ∧X(ϕ → ψ)⇒ Xψ (side-effect problem)
2. |= ϕ → ψ ⇒|= Xϕ → Xψ (side-effect problem)
3. |= ϕ ⇔ ψ ⇒|= Xϕ ⇔ Xψ (side-effect problem)
4. |= ϕ ⇒|= Xϕ (transference-problem)
5. |= (Xϕ ∧Xψ)→ X(ϕ ∧ψ) (unrestricted combining)
6. |= Xϕ → X(ϕ ∨ψ) (unrestricted weakening)
7. |= ¬(Xϕ ∧X¬ϕ)
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None of these properties except for (7) is valid when we take intention into consider-
ation. For instance, consider a situation where an agent i goes to the bookstore with
the intention of buying a paper-back and also with the intention of buying a magazine
because he has a general intention to buy them.1 Hence according to (5) it could be
formally given as:
INTi(paperback)∧ INTi(magazine)→ INTi(paperback∧magazine)
But this general intention is defeasible in the sense that at the bookstore the agent might
find that he doesn’t have enough money to buy both of them and hence drops intention
to buy each of them and now only intends to buy one of them. NMLs fail to account
for such type of reasoning. In Sugimoto [20] an extra notion of preference is added and
an ordering among the preferences is done to capture the desired effect. But we argue
that, in general, such intentions are defeasible and hence a non-monotonic reasoning
system would be more efficient for such occasions. The above example could be stated
in a non-monotonic setup as
(1) paper-back(X)⇒ buy(X), (2) magazine(X)⇒ buy(X), (3) costly(X); ¬buy(X);
where (1) and (2) are premises which reflects the agents general intention of buying a
paper-back and magazine unless there is other evidence like (3) suggesting that he/she
may not be able to buy. When intention is formalised in the background of NMLs it
is often the case that the agent has to have a complete description of the environment
before-hand or has to be omniscient in the sense of knowing all the consequences. Clas-
sically the logical omniscience problem amounts to say that an agent has to compute
all consequences of its own theory. It is obvious that some of the consequences are not
intended as shown above. Moreover in classical NML the set of consequences is infi-
nite. Hence we need a system like DL (defeasible logic) which is easily implementable
and where the set of consequences consists of the set of literals occurring in the agent
theory i.e. in the knowledge base, which is finite.
4 Overview of Defeasible Logic
As shown in the previous section, reasoning about general intention has a defeasible
nature (in the sense that it is fallible) and hence we need an efficient and easily im-
plementable system to capture the required defeasible instances. Defeasible logic, as
developed by Nute [16] with a particular concern about computational efficiency and
developed over the years by [3,2,1] is our choice. The reason being easy implementation
[15], flexibility [1] (it has a constructively defined and easy to use proof theory) and it
is efficient: It is possible to compute the complete set of consequences of a given theory
in linear time [13]. We do not address any semantic issues in this paper but the argu-
mentation semantics as given in [9] could be straightforwardly extended to the present
case.
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of DL. A defeasible theory contains
five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a
1 The example is a slightly modified one as given in [20].
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superiority relation. We consider only essentially propositional rules. Rules containing
free variables are interpreted as the set of their variable-free instances.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Vineet is a System Administrator”.
In the logic, this might be expressed as SA(vineet).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indis-
putable (e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “System-
Administrators are Super-Users”. Written formally: SA(X)→ SU(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example
of such a rule is “Super-Users are typically root”; written formally: SU(X)⇒ Root(X).
The idea is that if we know that someone is a super-user, then we may conclude that
he/she is root, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it may not be root.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is
to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible
rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If a user is normal-user
then he might not be a root”. Formally: NU(X);¬Root(X). The main point is that the
information that a user is NU is not sufficient evidence to conclude that he/she is not
root. It is only evidence that the user may not be able to become root. In other words,
we don’t wish to conclude ¬root if NU , we simply want to prevent a conclusion Root.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that
is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the
defeasible rules r : SU ⇒ Root and r′ : RW ⇒ ¬Root which contradict one another,
no conclusive decision can be made about whether a Super-User with a read & write
permission can be root. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then
we can indeed conclude that the Super-User cannot be root. The superiority relation is
required to be acyclic. It turns out that we only need to define the superiority relation
over rules with contradictory conclusions.
It is not possible in this short paper to give a complete formal description of the
logic. However, we hope to give enough information about the logic to make the dis-
cussion intelligible. We refer the reader to [16,3,2] for more thorough treatments.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the
empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head) C(r)
which is a literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs,
the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd ,
and the set of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent
q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of facts, R a finite
set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q, meaning that q is definitely provable in D (using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q, meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q, meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D= (F,R,>). A deriva-
tion is a finite sequence P= (P(1), . . .P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying four conditions
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(which correspond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclusion). P(1..i)
denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i
+∆ : If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) :+∆a ∈ P(1..i)
−∆ : If P(i+1) =−∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆a ∈ P(1..i)
The definition of ∆ describes just forward chaining of strict rules. For a literal q to be
definitely provable we need to find a strict rule with head q, of which all antecedents
have been definitely proved previously. And to establish that q cannot be proven def-
initely we must establish that for every strict rule with head q there is at least one
antecedent which has been shown to be non-provable.
+∂ : If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) :+∂a ∈ P(1..i).
−∂ : If P(i+1) =−∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) :+∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [q] either t 6> s or
∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i).
Let us work through this condition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have two
choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using
the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or
defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to consider
possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of ∼q. To be more specific: to
prove q defeasibly we must show that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we
must consider the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have
head ∼q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they could not be used to
support the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given earlier).
Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such
rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following properties: (i)
t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each attack on
the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule. In other words, r and the
rules t form a team (for q) that defeats the rules s.
The purpose of the −∂ inference rules is to establish that it is not possible to prove
+∂ . This rule is defined in such a way that all the possibilities for proving +∂q (for ex-
ample) are explored and shown to fail before −∂q can be concluded. Thus conclusions
tagged with −∂ are the outcome of a constructive proof that the corresponding positive
conclusion cannot be obtained.
Sometimes all we want to know is whether a literal is supported, that is if there is a
chain of reasoning that would lead to a conclusion in absence of conflicts. This notion
is captured by the following proof conditions:
+Σ : if P(i+1) = +Σ p then
(1) +∆ p ∈ P(1..i) or
(2) ∃rsd [p] : ∀a ∈ A(r)+Σa ∈ P(1..i).
−Σ : if P(i+1) =−Σ p then
(1) −∆ p ∈ P(1..i) and
(2) ∀rsd [p]∃a ∈ A(r) :−Σa ∈ P(1.i)
The notion of support corresponds to monotonic proofs using both the monotonic (strict
rules) and non-monotonic (defeasible rules) parts of defeasible theories.
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5 Defeasible Logic for Intentions
As we have seen in section 3 NMLs have been put forward to capture the intensional
nature of mental attitudes such as, for example, intention. Usually modal logics are
extensions of classical propositional logic with some intensional operators. Thus any
classical (normal) modal logic should account for two components: (1) the underlying
logical structure of the propositional base and (2) the logic behavior of the modal oper-
ators. Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional logic is not well suited to deal with
real life scenarios. The main reason is that the descriptions of real-life cases are, very
often, partial and somewhat unreliable. In such circumstances classical propositional
logic might produce counterintuitive results in so far as it requires complete, consistent
and reliable information. Hence any modal logic based on classical propositional logic
is doomed to suffer from the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how modalities can be introduced and
manipulated. Some common rules for modalities are Necessitation and RM [4]. Con-
sider the necessitation rule of normal modal logic which dictates the condition that an
agent knows all the valid formulas and thereby all the tautologies. Such a formalisa-
tion might suit for the knowledge an agent has but definitely not for the intention part.
Moreover an agent need not be intending all the consequences of a particular action it
does. It might be the case that it is not confident of them being successful. Thus the two
rules are not appropriate for a logic of intention.
A logic of policy-based intention should take care of the underlying principles gov-
erning such intentions. It should have a notion of the direct and indirect knowledge of
the agent, where the former relates to facts as literals whereas the latter to that of the
agent’s theory of the world in the form of rules. Similarly the logic should also be able
to account for general intentions as well as the policy-based (derived ones) intentions
of the agent.
Accordingly a defeasible intention theory is a structure (F,RK ,RI ,>) where, as
usual F is a set of facts, RK is a set of rules for knowledge (i.e., →K , ⇒K , ;K), RI
is a set of rules for intention (i.e., →I , ⇒I , ;I), and >, the superiority relation, is a
binary relation over the set of rules (i.e., >⊆ (RK ∪RI)2).
Intuitively, given an agent, F consists of the information the agent has about the
world and its immediate intentions; RK corresponds to the agent’s theory of the world,
while RI encodes its policy and > its strategy (or its preferences). The policy part of a
defeasible theory capture both intentions and goals. The main difference is the way the
agent perceives them: goals are possible outcomes of a given context while intentions
are the actual goals the agent tries to achieve in the actual situation. In other words goals
are the choices an agent has and intentions are the chosen goals; in case of conflicting
goals (policies) the agent has to evaluate the pros and cons and then decide according
to its aims (preferences), which are encoded by the superiority relation.
In what follows we provide the appropriate inference rules for intentions, and we
identify strong intentions – i.e., intentions for which there are no alternatives – using
±∆I ; goals using ±ΣI , and intentions using ±∂I .
In order to correctly capture the notion of intention we extend the signature of the
logic with the modal operator INT; thus if l is literal then INTl and ¬INTl are modal
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literals. However we impose some restrictions on the form of the rules: modal literals
can only occur in the antecedents of rules for intention.
Derivability for knowledge (±∆K , ±∂K) has the same conditions as those given
for derivability in Section 4. It is true that the complete and accurate definition of the
inference conditions is cumbersome but the intuition is natural and easy to understand.
The conditions for deriving an intention are as follows:
+∆I : if P(i+1) = +∆I p then
(1) INTp ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RKs [p]∀a ∈ A(r) :+∆Ia ∈ P(1..i) or
(3) ∃r ∈ RIs[p] such that
(3.1) ∀INTa ∈ A(r) :+∆Ia ∈ P(1..i) and
(3.2) ∀a ∈ A(r) :+∆Ka ∈ P(1..i).
−∆I : if P(i+1) =−∆I p then
(1) INTp /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RKs [p]
(2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆Ka ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆Ia ∈ P(1..i); and
(3) ∀r ∈ RIs[p] either
(3.1) ∃INTa ∈ A(r) :−∆Ia ∈ P(1..i) or
(3.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆Ka ∈ P(1..i).
To prove a strong intention, we need either that the intention is unconditional (1), or
that we have a strict rule for intention (an irrevocable policy) whose antecedent is in-
disputable (3). However we have another case (2): if an agent knows that B is an in-
disputable consequence of A, and it strongly intends A, then it must intend B. This is
in contrast with the NML interpretation whereby the agent has to intend all the conse-
quences of his/her intention.
To prove that a strong intention A does not hold (−∆IA), first, A should not be a
basic intention (1); then we have to discard all possible reasons in favour of it. If A is
a definite consequence of B, that is B→K A ∈ RK , we can disprove it if we can show
that (2.1) B is not the case (i.e., −∆KB) or (2.2) B is not strongly intended (i.e., −∆IB).
In case of strict policies for A (3), such as, for example the strict rule for intention
INTB,C→I A, we have to show that either B is not strongly intended (3.1), or the fact
triggering the policy is not the case (3.2).
At the other extreme we have goals: literals supported by evidence and basic inten-
tions.
+ΣI : if P(i+1) = +ΣI p then
(1) INTp ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RKs [p]∀a ∈ A(r) :+ΣIa ∈ P(1..i) or
(3) ∃r ∈ RIs[p] such that
(3.1) ∀INTa ∈ A(r) :+ΣIa ∈ P(1..i) and
(3.2) ∀a ∈ A(r) :+ΣKa ∈ P(1..i).
−ΣI : if P(i+1) =−ΣI p then
(1) INTp /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RKs [p]
(2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−ΣKa ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−ΣIa ∈ P(1..i); and
(3) ∀r ∈ RIs[p] either
(3.1) ∃INTa ∈ A(r) :−ΣIa ∈ P(1..i) or
(3.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−ΣKa ∈ P(1..i).
The inference conditions for goals are very similar to those for strong intentions; es-
sentially they are monotonic proofs using both the monotonic part (strict rules) and the
supportive non-monotonic part (defeasible rules) of a defeasible theory.
On the other hand to capture intentions we have to use the superiority relations to
resolve conflicts. Thus we can give the following definition for the inference rules for
±∂I .
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+∂I : if P(i+1) = +∂I p then
1) +∆I p ∈ P(1..i) or
2.1) −∆K∼p,−∆I∼p ∈ P(1..i) and
2.2) either
.1) ∃r ∈ RKsd [p]∀a ∈ A(r) :+∂Ia ∈ P(1..i), or
.2) ∃r ∈ RIsd [p] ∀INTa,b ∈ A(s) :
∂Ia,+∂Kb ∈ P(1..i); and
2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼p] either
.1) if s ∈ RK [∼p] then
∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂Ia ∈ P(1..i) and
∃b ∈ A(s) :−∂Kb ∈ P(1..i); and
if s ∈ RI [∼p] then either
∃INTa ∈ A(s) :−∂Ia ∈ P(1..i) or
∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂Ka ∈ P(1..i); or
.2) ∃t ∈ R[p] such that t > s and
if t ∈ RK [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) :+∂Ka or
∀a ∈ A(t) :+∂Ia; and
if t ∈ RI [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) :+∂Ka and
∀INTa ∈ A(t) :+∂Ia.
−∂I : if P(i+1) =−∂I p then
1) −∆I p ∈ P(1..i) and
2.1) +∆K∼p or +∆I∼p ∈ P(1..i) or
2.2) both
.1) ∀r ∈ RKsd [p] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂Ka ∈ P(1..i), and
∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂Ia ∈ P(1..i); and
.2) ∀r ∈ RIsd [p] ∃INTa ∈ A(s) :−∂Ia ∈ P(1..i) or
∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂Ka ∈ P(1..i); or
2.3)
.1) ∃s ∈ RK [∼p] ∀a ∈ A(s) :+∂Ka or
∀a ∈ A(s) :+∂Ia, or
∃s ∈ RK [∼p] ∀a ∈ A(s) :+∂Ka and
∀INTa ∈ A(s) :+∂Ia; and
.2) ∀t ∈ R[p] either t 6> s or
if t ∈ RK [p] then ∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂Ka and
∃b ∈ A(t) :−∂Ib; and
if t ∈ RI [p] then ∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂Ka or
∃INTa ∈ A(t) :−∂Ia.
The conditions for proving defeasible intentions are essentially the same as those given
for defeasible derivations in Section 4. The only difference is that at each stage we
have to check for two cases, namely: (1) the rule used is a rule for an intention; (2) the
rule is a rule for knowledge. In the first case we have to verify that factual antecedent
are defeasibly proved/disproved using knowledge (±∂K), and intentional antecedent
are defeasibly proved/disproved using intention (±∂I). In the second case we have to
remember that a conclusion of a factual rule can be transformed in an intention if all the
literals in the antecedent are defeasibly intended. The intuition behind the definition of
−∂I is a combination of the motivation for −∂ and the intuition of −∆I .
We want to illustrate some of the aspects of derivability by means of examples. If
it does not rain we intend to play cricket, and if we intend to play cricket we intend to
stay outdoor. This example can be formalized as follows
¬rain⇒I cricket INTcricket⇒I outdoor
Once the fact ¬rain is supplied we can derive +∂Icricket, and then the intention of
staying outdoor (+∂Ioutdoor). However the same intention cannot be derived if the fact
cricket is given.
If Vineet intend to travel to Italy then he intend to travel to Europe since Italy is in
Europe. This argument can be formalized by the rule Italy→K Europe plus the basic
intention INTItaly. The conclusion +∆IEurope follows from clause (2) of +∆I .
Most of the BDI systems are able to express positive and negative introspection of
belief and intentions. Those notions are encoded, respectively, by the following axioms.
INTφ → BEL(INTφ) ¬INTφ → BEL(¬INTφ)
One of the main effect of positive (resp. negative) introspection is the ability of using
established (resp. rejected) intentions in epistemic contexts to derive (resp. prevent the
A Defeasible Logic of Policy-based Intention 423
derivation of) other intentions. But this is what is done in Clause 2 of+∆I , Clause 2.2.1
of +∂I , for positive introspection, and Clause 2.2 of −∆I and Clause 2.2.1 of −∂I for
negative introspection.
The purpose of the −∆ and −∂ inference rules is to establish that it is not possible
to prove a corresponding tagged literal. These rules are defined in such a way that all the
possibilities for proving +∂ p (for example) are explored and shown to fail before −∂ p
can be concluded. Thus conclusions with these tags are the outcome of a constructive
proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot be obtained.
As a result, there is a close relationship between the inference rules for +∂ and
−∂ , (and also between those for +∆ and −∆ , and +Σ and −Σ ). The structure of the
inference rules is the same, but the conditions are negated in some sense. This feature
allows us to prove some properties showing the well behaviour of defeasible logic.
Theorem 1. Let # = ∆K ,∂K ,ΣK ,∆I ,∂I ,ΣI , and D be a defeasible theory. There is no
literal p such that D `+#p and D ` −#p.
The intuition behind the above theorem states that no literal is simultaneously provable
and demonstrably unprovable, thus it establishes the coherence of the defeasible logic
presented in this paper.
Theorem 2. Let D be a defeasible theory, and M ∈ {K, I}. D `+∂M p and D `+∂M∼p
iff D `+∆M p and D `+∆M∼p.
This theorem gives the consistency of defeasible logic. In particular it affirms that it is
not possible to obtain conflicting intentions (+∂I p and +∂I∼p) unless the information
given about the environment is itself inconsistent. Notice, however, that the theorem
does not cover goals (ΣI). Indeed, it is possible to have conflicting goals.
Let D be a defeasible theory. With ∆+K we denote the set of literals strictly provable
using the epistemic (knowledge) part of D, i.e., ∆+K = {p : D ` +∆K p}. Similarly for
the other proof tags.
Theorem 3. For every defeasible theory D, and M ∈ {K, I}
1. ∆+M ⊆ ∂+M ⊆ Σ+M ; 2. Σ−M ⊆ ∂−M ⊆ ∆−M .
This theorem states that strict intentions are intentions (∆+I ⊆ ∂+I ), and intentions are
goals (∂+I ⊆ Σ+I ), which corresponds to the BDI principle INTφ → GOALφ . At the
same time, we have that ∆+K ⊆ ∂+K . Thus if we assume that ∆K corresponds to knowledge
and ∂K corresponds to belief we obtain KNOWφ → BELφ , the standard BDI axiom
relating the two epistemic notions.
The proposed theory of intention satisfies many of the properties outlined by Brat-
man in [8]. The role of intention as a conduct-controlling pro-attitude rather than conduct-
influencing is clearly illustrated in the elaborate proof-theory outlined for the types of
intention. The proposed theory supports the fact that the rationality of an agent for his
intention depends on the rationality of the relevant processes leading to that intention
where the relevant processes includes using superiority relations to resolve conflicts as
well as satisfying the rules of inclusion as shown in Theorem 3. The new approach pro-
vides a good formalisation as to the relation between guiding intention and intentional
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action termed as historical principle of policy-based rationality in [8]. The problem in
general is to account for the rationality of an agent in performing a particular policy-
based intention from a general policy. In our approach the defeasibility of general poli-
cies makes it possible to block/not block the application of the policy to the particular
case without abandoning the policy.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Based on Bratman’s classification of intention, we have outlined a policy-based the-
ory of intention which differs from the usual NML-based approaches in the sense of
having a non-monotonic nature. To capture the properties involved in such intentions
we adopted defeasible logic as the non-monotonic reasoning mechanism due to its effi-
ciency and easy implementation as well as the defeasible nature of policy-based inten-
tions. The new approach alleviates most of the problems related to logical-omniscience.
We pointed out that some of the problems related to intention re-consideration could be
easily understood through such an approach.
The approach outlined in this paper could be extended in at least two different di-
rections.
The first is in alliance with the work done in [19,12]. Here they outline a policy
description language called PDL and use logic programs to reason about the policies.
The main concern in that work is in tracing the event history that gives rise to an action
history based on stable model semantics. In a similar manner our approach could be
developed using the appropriate semantics (Kunen [14] or argumentation [9]) and
developed from a logic programming point of view. The advantage in our approach is
the use of the superiority relation (>) whereby we can mention a hierarchy between the
rules and this is absent in other works.
The second direction in which our work could be extended is to define various rules
required for constructing goals from beliefs, intentions from goals, intentions from be-
liefs etc. and giving a superiority relation among these rules. The recent work on BDI
[21] seems to take this direction. On the other hand many new applications in emerging
information technologies have advanced needs for managing relations such as autho-
rization, trust and control among interacting agents (humans or artificial). This neces-
sitates new models and mechanisms for structuring and flexible management of those
relations. The issues of automated management of organisations in terms of policies
and trust relations in highly dynamic and decentralised environments has become the
focus in recent years.
Finally, as we have alluded to many semantics have been devised for defeasible logic
and can be adapted straightforwardly to the extension proposed here. The method devel-
oped in [14] gives a set-theoretic fixed-point construction for ∆+,∂+, . . ., which leads
to a logic programming characterisation of defeasible logic. Programs corresponding
to defeasible theories are sound and complete wrt Kunen semantics. The same tech-
nique is applicable in the present case with the obvious adjustments; however, it does
not offer further insights on defeasible logic for BDI, because of the almost one-to-one
correspondence between the inference conditions and the steps of the fixed-point con-
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struction. However semantics for defeasible BDI logic remains an interesting technical
problem.
References
1. G. Antoniou, D. Billington, G. Governatori, and M. Maher. A flexible framework for defea-
sible logics. In AAAI’2000, pages 401–405. AAAI/MIT Press, 2000.
2. G. Antoniou, D. Billington, G. Governatori, and M. J. Maher. Representation Results for
Defeasible Logic. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2(2):255–287, April 2001.
3. D. Billington. Defeasible logic is stable. Journal of Logic and Computation, 3:370–400,
1993.
4. B. F. Chellas. Modal Logic, An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
5. X. Chen and G. Liu. A logic of intention. In ICJAI’99, 1999.
6. P. R. Cohen and H. J. Levesque. Persistence, intention and commitment. In In proceedings
Timberline workshop on Reasoning about plans and actions, pages 297–338, 1986.
7. P. R. Cohen and H. J. Levesque. Intention is choice with commitment. Artificial Intelligence,
42(3), 1990.
8. M. E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1987.
9. G. Governatori and M. J. Maher. An Argumentation-Theoretic Characterization of Defeasi-
ble Logic. In ECAI-2000, pages 469–473, 2000.
10. J. Hintikka. Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press, 1962.
11. M. E. Pollock and K. Konolige. A representationalist theory of intention. In IJCAI-93, pages
390–395, 1993.
12. J. Lobo, R. Bhatia, and S. Naqvi. A policy description language. In AAAI-99. AAAI/MIT
Press, 1999.
13. M. J. Maher. Propositional defeasible logic has linear complexity. Theory and Practice of
Logic Programming, 1(6):691–711, 2001.
14. M. J. Maher and G. Governatori. A semantic decomposition of defeasible logic. In AAAI-99,
1999.
15. M. J. Maher, A. Rock, G. Antoniou, D. Billignton, and T. Miller. Efficient defeasible rea-
soning systems. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence Tools, 10(4), 2001.
16. D. Nute. Defeasible logic. In Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Pro-
gramming, volume 3, pages 353–395. Oxford University Press, 1987.
17. A. S. Rao and M. P.Georgeff M.P. Modelling rational agents within a BDI-architecture. In
KR’91, pages 473–484. Morgan Kaufmann, 1991.
18. M. P. Singh. Semantical considerations on intention dynamics for BDI agents. Journal of
Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1998.
19. T. C. Son and J. Lobo. Reasoning about policies using logic programa. AAAI-spring sym-
posium on answer set programming, March 26-28 2001.
20. T. Sugimoto. A preference-based theory of intention. In PRICAI-2000, Springer-Verlag,
2000.
21. J. Thanagrajah, L. Padgham and J. Harland. Representation and reasoning for goals in BDI
agents. In Australasian Conference on Computer Science, 2002.
22. B. Van Linder. Modal Logic for Rational Agents. PhD thesis, Department of Computer
Science, Utrecht University, 19th June 1996.
23. R. Zamparelli. Intentions are plans plus wishes (and more). In AAAI Spring symposium-93,
1993.
